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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff/Appellee,

:

vs.

:

JOLENE M WILBER,

:

Defendant/Appellant.

Case No. 980271-CA

Priority No. 2

:
BRIEF OF APPELLEE

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
Defendant, Jolene M. Wilber, appeals her conviction of communications fraud,
a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1801 (Supp. 1998). This
Court has jurisdiction to hear this appeal under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (1996).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE
Did the district court abuse its discretion by ordering restitution where, despite
intervening events, defendant's actions ultimately led to the victim's pecuniary loss?
STANDARD OF REVIEW
An appellate court will not disturb an order of restitution unless the trial court
exceeded its authority or abused its discretion. State v. Snvder. 747 P.2d 417, 422 (Utah
1987); State v. Garcia. 866 P.2d 5, 6 (Utah App. 1993); State v. Robinson. 860 P.2d 979,
980 (Utah App. 1993), cert, denied. 878 P.2d 1154 (Utah 1994).

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
The text of all constitutional provisions, statutes, and rules pertinent to the
resolution of the issues before this Court is contained in the body of this brief.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On November 17, 1997, defendant Jolene M. Wilber was charged by information
with two counts of communications fraud, both second degree felonies, in violation of
Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1801(1) (Supp. 1998) (R. 6). The information was later amended
to change the second count to a third degree felony (id.).
On February 2, 1998, defendant pleaded guilty to one count of communications
fraud, a third degree felony, in violation of section 76-10-1801(1) (R. 21-26). As part of
her plea agreement, defendant acknowledged that she "may be ordered by the Court to
make restitution to any victim(s) of [her] crimes" (R. 24).
Following a restitution hearing on February 20,1998, defendant was ordered to pay
restitution in the amount of $21,600 to be split between the two victims in this case (R. 37,
39-41). However, because defendant had already deposited $13,500 to the district court
(R. 20, 39, 69:5), the court only ordered that defendant pay an additional $8100 in
restitution (R. 37). Defendant was subsequently sentenced to an indeterminate term of
zero-to-five years in the Utah State Prison (R. 42-43). This appeal ensued (R. 53-54).
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STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS
On May 24, 1997, defendant assisted her mother, Darleen Leeper, in purchasing
a used car from Tim Dahle Infinity ("Tim Dahle") for $21,995 (R. 69:7-8,10, 31-32,40).
The car was purchased with a check drawn on the account of Matt Wilber, defendant's
husband (R. 69:40). Although defendant and her mother were given possession of the car,
Tim Dahle kept the title pending the check clearing on Matt Wilber*s account
(R. 69:18-19). On May 30, 1997, Tim Dahle attempted to cash the check (R. 69:42).
The check did not clear, and Tim Dahle never received payment for the car (R. 69:31-32).
Tim Dahle continued to retain the title (R. 69:18).
On June 3, 1997, defendant sold the car to Low Book Sales ("Low Book") for
$13,500 (R. 22, 69:18). Defendant did not have the title, but represented to Low Book
that the title would clear, even though she knew it would not (R. 22, 69:19). Low Book
subsequently requested the title from Tim Dahle, but Tim Dahle refused to release it until
the car was paid for (R. 69:19).
In August 1997, the parties began to negotiate for the return of the car to Tim Dahle
(R. 69:19). Tim Dahle proposed that defendant give Low Book $13,500 in exchange for
the car and then return to the car to Tim Dahle (R. 69:19-20). However, this arrangement
was contingent upon Tim Dahle's right to inspect the car before accepting return of it
(R. 69:20). Low Book apparently agreed, but because it had resold the car, it had to
recover the car before the deal could be completed (R. 69:20, 22-24). Additionally,
3

Low Book refused to permit Tim Dahle to inspect the car until Low Book had been repaid
by defendant (R. 69:21, 33).
On November 25, 1997, Tim Dahle finally retrieved the car by paying Low Book
$5000 (R. 69:8, 23). Additionally, the car had suffered about $3200 in depreciation, and
Tim Dahle expended $673.33 for repairs and $60 for detailing the car (R. 69:9-10).
At defendant's restitution hearing, Tim Dahle1 s representative testified that
Tim Dahle's expenses related to its recovery of the car were approximately $9000
(R. 69:10,27). Tim Dahle's representative also testified that the depreciation was partially
due to the number of miles the car had been driven from the time it was purchased from
Tim Dahle until the time it was retrieved (R. 11-12, 14, 31). At the time of purchase from
Tim Dahle, the car had about 74,000 miles on it (R. 69:11, 16, Defendant's Exhibit 2);
at the time defendant sold the car to Low Book, it had about 74,700 miles on it
(Defendant's Exhibit 3); and at the time Tim Dahle retrieved the car from Low Book,
it had about 80,000 miles on it (R. 69:11, 34, State's Exhibit 1). At the conclusion of the
restitution hearing, the district court decided that some of Tim Dahle's economic loss
was attributable to Low Book, and therefore reduced the restitution award to from $9000
to $8100 (R. 37, 69:50-52).
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
On appeal, defendant argues that the district court abused its discretion by ordering
her to pay restitution in the amount of $8100 to Tim Dahle. Specifically, she asserts that
because Tim Dahle's pecuniary loss should be attributed to Low Book's actions, not her1 s,
she should not be held liable for restitution to Tim Dahle. However, defendant's argument
fails because her actions set in motion the very events that ultimately led to Tim Dahle's
pecuniary loss. Accordingly, the district court's restitution order is entitled to affirmance
on appeal.
ARGUMENT
THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS
DISCRETION BY ORDERING RESTITUTION WHERE,
ALTHOUGH THERE WERE INTERVENING EVENTS,
DEFEND ANTS ACTIONS ULTIMATELY LED TO THE
VICTIM'S PECUNIARY LOSS
At the time of defendant's restitution hearing, Utah's restitution statute, Utah Code
Ann. § 76-3-201 (Supp. 1997),l provided in pertinent part:
When a person is convicted of criminal activity that has
resulted in pecuniary damages, in addition to any other
sentence it may impose, the court shall order that the defendant
make restitution to victims of crime as provided in this
subsection, or for conduct for which defendant has agreed to
make restitution as part of a plea agreement....
1

In her brief on appeal, defendant cites to the 1998 version of Utah's restitution
statute, Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201 (Supp. 1998), which did not become effective until
May 4, 1998. However, inasmuch as defendant has not raised any arguments below or
on appeal based on the recent changes in section 76-3-201, those arguments are waived.
5

Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-20l(4)(a)(i) (Supp. 1997). Furthermore, because the language of
that section is mandatory, the district court must order restitution unless it determines that
restitution is inappropriate under the particular facts of the case before it. See State v.
Dickey, 841 P.2d 1203, 1207 (Utah App. 1992) (citing Snyder, 747 P.2d at 420), cert.
denied, 853 P.2d 897 (Utah 1993).
It is well settled that an order of restitution should not be disturbed on appeal unless
the trial court exceeded its authority or abused its discretion. State v. Twitchell. 832 P.2d
866, 868 (Utah App. 1992); accord Snyder, 747 P.2d at 422; Garcia. 866 P.2d at 6;
Robinson. 860 P.2d at 980. Moreover, an abuse of discretion will be found only if
this Court determines that "fno reasonable [person] would take the view adopted by the
trial court.'" State v. Schweitzer. 943 P.2d 649, 651 (Utah App. 1997) (quoting State v.
Gerrard. 584 P.2d 885, 887 (Utah 1978)).
Turning to the case at bar, it cannot be said that no reasonable person would take
the view adopted by the district court here. At the end of the restitution hearing, the
district court found:
The restitution claim approximates $9,000. In looking
at State's Exhibit No. 1, there is a breakdown of some of that
and some of that is undisputed. It appears to me that the
statute clearly does require that restitution that is ordered be
attributable to the defendant's criminal behavior. There's not
a bright line test for that and each case is fact sensitive.
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In this particular case, I do have some concerns about
the conduct of Low Book, because they certainly made-their
actions seemed to have increased some of the damages here
and but for that particular conduct, the economic loss to
[Tim Dahle] would be less. And some of-clearly the
defendant put into motion a series of events that resulted in a
substantial loss to both victims. And I'm not critical- I don't
mean to sound critical of either victim here except to the extent
that Low Book resold the vehicle, and it was after that that
the-so much of the additional mileage was put on the car
before this ultimately was resolved.
I'm not adjudicating anything, really, between
[Tim Dahle] and Low Book. It seemed to me [Tim Dahle]
did-took rather heroic measures to try to recover this car.
And counsel-well, not counsel but the parties, [Tim Dahle]
and Low Book, even had to retain counsel to negotiate all this
as well as having people from each organization working on
this as well.
R. 69:49-50 (emphasis added). The district court additionally considered several other
factors, including defendant's age and other abilities and the fact that defendant owed
restitution in other cases, and concluded that she had the ability to pay restitution. See
R. 69:51. The district court then adjusted the amount of restitution from $9000 to $8100
based on the portion of Tim Dahle' s pecuniary damages that were attributable to
Low Book's actions. See R. 69:51-52.
In light of the above facts, the view adopted by the district court here is not
unreasonable. First, by knowingly and voluntarily pleading guilty, defendant admitted that
she aided her mother in fraudulently procuring the car from Tim Dahle with a check that
bounced, and that she then turned around and sold it to Low Book, knowing that she did
7

not have the title and would not be able to get it. See R. 22. Thus, she does not dispute
that she engaged in the behavior that ultimately led to Tim Dahle's pecuniary loss.
Accordingly, the only question before the district court was not whether to order
restitution, but how much restitution should be imposed. Here, Tim Dahle demonstrated
that its losses were about $9000, and those figures have not been challenged by defendant
below or on appeal. Rather, defendant challenges only whether she should be held liable
for those amounts. However, because the amount of restitution ordered by the district
court is less than the victim's losses, even considering Low Book's intervening actions,
that figure is not unreasonable, and thus, cannot constitute an abuse of the broad discretion
given to district courts in these matters.
Moreover, this result directly follows from another restitution decision of this
Court. In State v. McBride. 940 P.2d 539 (Utah App.), cert, denied, 953 P.2d 449
(Utah 1997), the defendant challenged an order of restitution, claiming that the
"intervening and superseding negligence of the police" relieved him of any liability for any
loss suffered by the victim in that case. Id. at 541. This Court rejected the defendant's
argument, specifically holding that the negligence of the police was not so unforeseeable
as to supersede the fault of the defendant in causing the victim's loss. IdL at 544. The
Court additionally held that but for appellant's criminal act, which resulted in the
impoundment that created the opportunity for the police officers' error, the victim's loss
would not have occurred. IdL
8

Similarly, in the case at bar, the damages that were suffered after Low Book sold
the car were not so unforeseeable as to supercede defendant's fault in causing Tim Dahle's
loss. In fact, inasmuch as Low Book is a used car dealer, it was readily foreseeable that
once Low Book obtained possession of the car, it would try to sell it. Moreover, under
a McBride analysis, it is clear that but for defendant's sale of the car to Low Book, which
created the opportunity for Low Book's sale of the car, the damages due to the extra
mileage put on the car would not have occurred.
Thus, defendant's argument that Low Book's resale of the car solely caused
Tim Dahle's pecuniary loss is meritless. It is beyond dispute that if defendant had not
gained possession of the car from Tim Dahle and sold it to Low Book, no damages would
have occurred. Defendant set in motion the very events that caused Tim Dahle's pecuniary
loss. Accordingly, the proper measure of restitution ought to be Tim Dahle's damages
from the date defendant and her mother drove it off Tim Dahle's lot until the date it was
returned to that lot. Consequently, if anything, the district court was lenient in reducing
defendant's restitution from $9000 to $8100.
Furthermore, defendant's argument that Low Book should be held solely liable for
Tim Dahle's pecuniary damages ignores the fact that the only additional damage found to
be done to the car after defendant sold it to Low Book was the extra mileage. As testified
to by Tim Dahle's representative at the restitution hearing, this only accounted for a small
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portion of the $3200 in depreciation to the car.2 See R. 69:14, 31. In fact, there was
conflicting testimony as to exactly how much it accounted for. Compare R.69:14 ($1450)
with R. 69:31 ($700). Furthermore, defendant's analysis does not account for the $5000
Tim Dahle had to pay to retrieve the car, nor the $673.33 for repairs, nor the $60 for
detailing the car. These are pecuniary damages for which there is no evidence supporting
defendant's claim that she should not be held liable for them.
Lastly, defendant devotes several pages of her brief on appeal to Low Book's
alleged "bad faith." Aplt. Brief at 11-13. First, this representation is contrary to the facts
found by the district court below. The district court did not find bad faith on the part of
Low Book and instead stated that it was not "critical of either victim here except to the
extent that Low Book resold the vehicle." R. 69:50. In fact, defendant's bad faith
argument is particularly specious in light of the fact that the district court praised both
victims' efforts to resolve this matter. I<L Second, Low Book's alleged bad faith is simply
irrelevant to the question of defendant's liability for restitution to Tim Dahle. As the
district court correctly acknowledged, the purpose of the restitution hearing was not to
adjudicate matters between Tim Dahle and Low Book, kL, but to determine defendant's
liability for the pecuniary loss suffered by Tim Dahle.

2

Counsel on appeal represents that "Tim Dahle testified that the added mileage
which resulted after Low Book sold the car was the single most significant depreciating
factor." Aplt. Brief at 11. However, the record is directly to the contrary. See
R.69:14, 31.
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In summary, if this Court accepts defendant's argument, it must hold that
Low Book's intervening actions essentially excused the actions undertaken by defendant,
and therefore, independently caused Tim Dahle1 s pecuniary loss. Not only is such a result
contrary to the facts of this case, it is untenable. This is especially true in light of the
goals of restitution: (1) to make the victim of the crime whole again and (2) to remind a
defendant of her wrongdoing and to require her to repay the costs society has incurred as
a result of her misconduct. See State v. Westerman. 945 P.2d 695, 699 n.4 (Utah App.
1997). Accordingly, this Court should reject defendant's argument on appeal and find that
the district court did not abuse its discretion by ordering restitution under the
circumstances of this case.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, the State respectfully requests that this Court affirm the
district court's order directing defendant to pay Tim Dahle Infinity $8100 in restitution.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 4

dav of January, 1999.

JAN GRAHAM
Attorney General

NORMAN E. PLATE
Assistant Attorney General
Counsel for Plaintiff/Appellee
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